Prevention of infection and disruption of the pathogen transfer chain in elective surgery by Chisari, Emanuele et al.
Journal Pre-proof
Prevention of Infection and Disruption of the Pathogen Transfer Chain in Elective
Surgery
Emanuele Chisari, MD, Chad A. Krueger, MD, C. Lowry Barnes, MD, Stefaan Van
Omsen, MD, William Walter, MD, Javad Parvizi, MD FRCS
PII: S0883-5403(20)30436-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arth.2020.04.049
Reference: YARTH 57969
To appear in: The Journal of Arthroplasty
Received Date: 16 April 2020
Revised Date: 16 April 2020
Accepted Date: 17 April 2020
Please cite this article as: Chisari E, Krueger CA, Lowry Barnes C, Van Omsen S, Walter W, Parvizi J,
Prevention of Infection and Disruption of the Pathogen Transfer Chain in Elective Surgery, The Journal
of Arthroplasty (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arth.2020.04.049.
This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition
of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of
record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published
in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that,
during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal
disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Prevention of Infection and Disruption of the Pathogen Transfer Chain in Elective Surgery. 
Emanuele Chisari MD1, Chad A, Krueger MD1, C. Lowry Barnes MD2, Stefaan Van Omsen MD 3, 
William Walter MD 3 Javad Parvizi MD FRCS1* 
 
1Rothman Orthopaedic Institute at Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, PA, US 
2
 Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, AR, US 
3 Royal North Shore Hospital, Sydney, Australia 
 
 
*Correspondence should be addressed to:  
Javad Parvizi MD 
125 S 9th Street, Suite 1000, Philadelphia, PA, US 
 
 1
Prevention of Infection and Disruption of the Pathogen Transfer Chain in Elective Surgery 1 
Emanuele Chisari MD1, Chad A, Krueger MD1, C. Lowry Barnes MD2, Stefaan Van Omsen MD 3, 2 
William Walter MD 3 Javad Parvizi MD FRCS1* 3 
 4 
1Rothman Orthopaedic Institute at Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, PA, US 5 
2
 Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, AR, US 6 
3 Royal North Shore Hospital, Sydney, Australia. 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
*Correspondence should be addressed to:  23 
Javad Parvizi MD 24 
125 S 9th Street, Suite 1000, Philadelphia, PA, US 25 
  26 
 2
Introduction 27 
The date was September 28th, 1918. 200,000 Philadelphia and Pennsylvania citizens united to celebrate 28 
the end of World War I. It was the day of the Liberty Loan Parade, a government initiative to promote the 29 
new bonds being issued to pay for war-associated cost. Most of the city’s population joyfully attended the 30 
event.  Three days later, 635 of attendees of the event fell ill to what was assumed to be common flu. By 31 
six months, over 16,000 of the event participants had died, and a half million more were infected in 32 
Pennsylvania. [1–3] Such was the power and impact of the ‘Spanish Flu’ (H1N1) which remains one of 33 
the worst pandemics in our history. Based on some estimations, it killed over 50 million people around 34 
the globe [1]. Ironically, and within the context of current pandemic 102 years later, some lessons are 35 
being re-learnt.  36 
 37 
While the outbreak of COVID-19, caused by SARS-CoV-2, does not appear to be on the same scale as 38 
the pandemic of 1918, it does share some of the same signatures of the “Spanish-flu” and, for that matter, 39 
some more recent pandemics. All of these pandemics were caused by a  virus originating from an animal 40 
source and spreading amongst humans by droplets and/or contact with bodily fluids. [4]. The SARS-Cov-41 
1 epidemic during 2002-2004, which started in China , was also caused by a coronavirus and killed 774 42 
people with a 9% fatality rate [5]. In 2009, the H1N1 pandemic spread across the globe and  killed over 43 
18,000 people in the United States alone [6,7]. Then, in 2012, another fatal coronavirus, known as Middle 44 
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), hit the Arabic peninsula[8]. All of these outbreaks were similar to 45 
what we face today but occurred on a much smaller scale. The major difference between the current 46 
pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2, and those before it is that the current virus appears to be highly 47 
contagious. In fact, COVID-19 has already caused ten-times as many cases as SARS in a quarter of the 48 
time [9]. The SARS-CoV-2 virus can also infect some people without causing many, or any, symptoms 49 
and is capable of surviving on surfaces for a relatively long period of time. The aforementioned qualities 50 
of SARS-CoV-2 makes the current COVID-19 pandemic a truly challenging one to manage. Especially 51 
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when considering that we live in an increasingly connected world that appears ideally suited for the rapid 52 
spread of diseases across countries and continents.  53 
 54 
 The medical community has been mindful of infection origination and pathogen transfer for 55 
centuries. As surgeons, we meticulously exercise the necessary steps to decrease the possibility of 56 
pathogen transfer and are acutely aware of the consequences of infection affecting our patients. Societies 57 
also have considerable knowledge regarding the importance of “breaking the chain of pathogen transfer”.  58 
In the middle of 19th century, Ignac Semmelweis, known as the Saviour of Mothers, [10] recognized the 59 
personal chain of pathogen transfer and mandated hand-washing to disrupt this process. Quarantines have 60 
an even more remote history, dating back to 14th century[11]. In an effort to protect the coastal cities from 61 
diseases arriving on incoming boats, passengers were placed in isolation for a period of time and 62 
monitored for the presence of disease before being allowed to interact with the local community. All of 63 
the measures implemented to address the COVID-19 pandemic, which have been in practice in the 64 
medical and surgical community for centuries, are intended to break the chain of pathogen transfer.  There 65 
is no doubt that this pandemic shall also pass and we will return to our “normal” lives. Many, however, 66 
believe that the new normalcy will have different features than what was present prior to COVID-19. Our 67 
profession will also witness changes in everyday routines that will be necessary to overcome the issues 68 
with the current pandemic and diminish the scale and gravity of future epidemic/pandemics. As we 69 
prepare to emerge from this pandemic and contemplate resuming our practices, we are faced with the 70 
ever-pertinent question of what changes will we need to implement in our daily routines. This article is 71 
written, with reliance on available evidence from the past and the current events, to provide some 72 
guidance on strategies that may need to be implemented to disrupt the chain of pathogen transfer. These 73 
strategies may also translate to a reduction in the rate of surgical site infections in the future.   74 
 75 
Resuming Elective Arthroplasty 76 
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There will come a day, hopefully in not so distant of a future, when the current pandemic subsides and 77 
elective surgical procedures are resumed. The decision of when to re-start elective procedures will be a 78 
complicated one being affected by societal, political, geographic, economic and health related factors. 79 
Once such normalcy resumes, we have to entertain the major question of what changes we will need to 80 
introduce in our practices to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 from infected hosts to others. We will 81 
also need to be cognizant of the potential for re-infection with the virus and the emergence of a second 82 
wave.  83 
 While any discussion regarding a SARS-CoV-2 ‘reinfection’ remains theoretical, a few recent 84 
articles have raised this possibility [12,13]. If such a phenomenon is indeed possible, three distinct 85 
explanations exist. First, patients who contract the disease do not develop lasting immunity against the 86 
virus and are just as vulnerable as those without a prior infection in contracting the disease. Second, there 87 
are issues with the accuracy of the test, with false positives and false negatives existing. So, it is possible 88 
that some of these presumed reinfections are a result of the re-test being a false negative result which was 89 
incorrectly interpreted as the individual being declared as “cured”. Finally, it is plausible, and indeed 90 
scientifically proven [14–17], that viruses undergo marked genetic mutations, even during an active 91 
pandemic. Hence those infected with the virus develop partial immunity and are still vulnerable for 92 
infection with the ‘new’ mutated version of the virus [14–17]. We are familiar with the concept of partial 93 
immunity as it relates to the flu-vaccine, as it affords only 60-70% immunity against the disease in any 94 
given year [18]. Based on scientific data, the genetic footprint of the initial SARS-CoV-2 affecting 95 
individuals in Wuhan is different than the RNA sequence of the virus affecting people in other countries  96 
[19]. The virus has certainly undergone mutation. In fact, these mutations likely explain why some 97 
epidemics come to an abrupt end as the continued viral alterations may revoke the virulence of the 98 
pathogen.         99 
So, without an effective vaccine against the virus, and without an absolute test for detection of the 100 
disease, we need to assume that every patient under our care, and for that matter healthcare personnel 101 
around us in the hospitals, are potential carriers of the virus and capable of spreading the infection. The 102 
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latter does not imply that we should not insist on large scale testing of every individual who comes out of 103 
social isolation and enters the society. The medical profession is aware of the importance of “screening” 104 
patients for a condition or a disease.   Identifying carriers of a pathogen is critical step in disruption of the 105 
chain of transfer.   106 
 107 
Disrupting the chain of pathogen transfer 108 
Infection, either viral, bacterial or fungal, can be transferred from one individual to another through air 109 
(droplets), direct contact with skin or bodily fluids or contact with a surface harboring the pathogens. 110 
Here, we summarize the importance of good practices that are known to be effective in disrupting the 111 
chain of pathogen transfer. We are aware that there remains many unknowns regarding COVID-19 and 112 
excited that the scientific discoveries and innovations arising from the current pandemic will serve the 113 
society in general, and healthcare profession in particular, for years to come.   114 
 115 
Patient screening. 116 
 117 
To determine the risk of a patient being infected with SARS-COV-2, all patients scheduled for elective 118 
surgery should be screened for symptoms and exposure.  Symptoms of infection include fever, sore 119 
throat, cough, and anosmia are common with a COVID-19 infection. Patients should also be asked if they 120 
have been exposed to anyone with known COVID-19 infection or anyone with symptoms of COVID-19 121 
to determine the risk.  Furthermore, the rate of infection in the community will be important as well as a 122 
patient’s history of travel from a region with known high rates of COVID-19 infection.  123 
 124 
Routine screening of nasopharyngeal swabs or throat swabs by PCR (polymerase chain reaction) to detect 125 
viral genetic material is subject to false positive and false negative results, and is therefore not indicated 126 
in low-risk patients.  Serological tests for IgG and IgM are not currently widely available but may become 127 
useful tools to determine the patient’s status.  There is limited data on their accuracy and they are not 128 
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regulated in the same manner as more standard antibody tests at this time so enthusiasm for these tests 129 
need to be tempered. All of these tests will undergo further refinements as we continue to expand our 130 
knowledge regarding immunity to COVID-19. We believe that questions regarding who should be 131 
screened and what screening should be in place is a pertinent one. Most, if not all, institutions will need to 132 
have access to a rapid turnaround test for COVID-19. A point of care test is currently available and 133 
should be utilized for emergency cases. Industry has also been able to develop special swabs that can be 134 
used to detect the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in the oral cavity, eliminating the need for more invasive 135 
nasopharyngeal swabs for testing.  136 
 137 
Prevention of transfer through direct contact 138 
 139 
Direct contact with an infected host is also a major pathway for the spread of pathogens. Thus, wearing 140 
protective gloves and gowns by all in the OR should be routine. Furthermore, scrub changes should be 141 
frequent throughout the day. Again, without a widespread screening mechanism in place for COVID-19, 142 
it is impossible for us to determine who is ‘safe.’ Another mechanism to glean information about the 143 
status of a patient would be the use of an antibody testing to identify those who had contracted the disease 144 
and developed immunity. 145 
 146 
Prevention of spread in the air 147 
 148 
Aerosolized particles have proven to be a mechanism of spread of SARS-CoV-2[20]. Aerosolization of 149 
virus particles usually does not occur with breathing or talking but some procedures in the operating room 150 
may cause aerosolization of virus particles. Droplets are expelled during talking and breathing but these 151 
usually do not become aerosolized and land on surfaces within a few minutes. Patients undergoing 152 
elective arthroplasty should be supplied with a simple surgical mask that will prevent the spread of 153 
droplets carrying the virus.  Personal protection equipment (PPE) should be available to all the healthcare 154 
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workers and should focus on masks that are able to filter any pathogen, while allowing for enough 155 
comfort to be worn for a substantial length of time. We, as surgeons, and healthcare workers in general, 156 
should also be fitted with such masks.  157 
 It is fortunate that the majority of arthroplasties are performed under regional anesthesia. 158 
Intubation of patient can cause aerosolization of a large number of particles in the upper airways and 159 
particular caution should be taken with this procedure when there is a risk that the patient may be carrying 160 
SARS-COV-2.  Anesthesia teams dealing with patients who require general anesthesia and airway 161 
management should be fitted with secure personal protection equipment (PPE). As orthopaedic surgeons, 162 
we use power tools (drills, saws, etc.) that releases aerosolized material [21] containing blood, bone and 163 
fat tissue.  The amount of virus particles in these tissues is not known but these instruments could 164 
potentially aerosolize virus particles in the operating room.  In patients who are positive for the virus, 165 
when surgery cannot be delayed, the power settings should be as low as possible, and suction devices 166 
should be carefully handled to remove any aerosol formation [22].  This may include suction fitted to 167 
electrocautery devices or sterile towels dropped over cutting surfaces to potentially decrease the amount 168 
of aerosolized. 169 
In cases of known SARS-CoV-2 positive patients, surgeons and other healthcare workers should also 170 
have ventilation systems that are able to filter and capture SARS-CoV-2, as well as other bacteria and 171 
fungi. These systems can be used outside of the operating area but should be present in every operating 172 
room. Given that coronaviruses are approximately 0.125 mm (125 um) in diameter [23] high-efficiency 173 
particulate air (HEPA) filters might be one possible solution. [24] Thus, filtration of the operating room 174 
with devices that intake the air and remove the micro-organisms may be preferable to the positive 175 
pressure laminar flow settings. Negative pressure operating rooms will reduce the risk of virus particles 176 
being forced out of the room into the corridors.   177 
The current surgical helmets (by Stryker and Zimmer-Biomet, for example) are not protective against 178 
spread of virus, as learnt during the 2012 SARS epidemic. They are designed to protect the user against 179 
splash back and can actually pull and condense sub-micron particles within the hood system [25]. All 180 
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reusable material should also be sanitized or sterilized at the conclusion of each procedure. Tests on the 181 
proper length of use for each mask and eventual reusing, should be performed to provide evidence-based 182 
guidelines to medical staff. Many questions remains: How long we should wear the mask?; How often  183 
should we  change the masks?; Can the  masks be sterilized and safely reused? And many others still 184 
remain unanswered. Further data is needed in order to provide evidence-based recommendations on these 185 
issues. 186 
 187 
 188 
Decontamination of Surfaces 189 
 190 
Every pathogen is capable of surviving on inanimate surfaces for a period of time [26]. We have come to 191 
understand that SARS-CoV-2 is a robust virus capable of surviving on the surfaces of metal and plastic  192 
for up to a few days and is not easily removed by standard air filtration systems [20,27,28]. Thus, another 193 
approach to disrupt the chain of pathogen transfer needs to concentrate on the decontamination and 194 
sanitization of inanimate and skin surfaces. One agent that has been demonstrated to be viricidal, 195 
including activity against coronaviruses, is dilute povidone iodine [29–31]. Dilute povidone iodine was 196 
tested against SARS, MERS and Ebola and found to have absolute efficacy. Other agents with potential 197 
activity against viruses, as well as bacterial and fungal pathogens, includes hypochlorite and high-198 
concentration alcohol. Thus, it is crucial that all reusable material in the OR, that includes helmets, lead 199 
aprons, tourniquets, X-ray machines, navigation consoles, keyboards, screens and robots be sanitized and 200 
decontaminated routinely. The current sterilization systems in the hospitals for instruments and trays are 201 
effective in eliminating viruses and may not need to be altered. We may, however, need to implement a 202 
practice that requires these instruments to be placed in a bath of antiseptic solution during the procedure 203 
to prevent potential contamination. We must also be aware that there is a wide variation in the terminal 204 
cleaning of the operating rooms across the globe. Effective infection prevention and viricidal protocols 205 
need to be implemented in every operating room and arguably in every patient room after discharge.    206 
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 207 
Conclusion 208 
The current pandemic has taken us into uncharted territories. The economic and health impact of this 209 
pandemic may be irreversible and will be felt for years to come. While we mourn the loss of lives to this 210 
pandemic, society needs to prepare for the eventual lift of social isolation and attempt to return to 211 
normalcy.  As our knowledge of this pathogen expands and we continue to work towards an effective 212 
vaccine and potential treatments for SARS-CoV-2, further strategies for the disruption of the chain of 213 
pathogen transfer needs to implemented. We have attempted to highlight some of the changes that 214 
arthroplasty surgeons will need to instigate now and when elective arthroplasties are resumed (table 1). 215 
While SARS-CoV-2 may be a novel pathogen, the actions needed to protect ourselves and our patients 216 
against the pathogen are not. The medical community and, more specifically, orthopedic surgeons have 217 
been acutely aware of the devastating impact of infections for centuries. We, as a medical community, 218 
have always been in the forefront of developing infection prevention protocols and implementing 219 
evidence-based strategies to combat these pathogens. Our fight against the COVID-19 will be no 220 
different. The ultimate changes that we implement as a result of this pandemic stand to serve our patients 221 
and the society well for years to come and help us all safely return to caring for our patients.  222 
  223 
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SURGICAL STEP SUGGESTED ACTION 
WAITING ROOM These should not be used. Family members can be called when the 
surgery is complete and should not enter or wait within the hospital 
unnecessarily. 
CHECK-IN A form of ‘mobile’ check-in would be preferable where the patient 
can call the desk and, when the staff is ready, be escorted directly to 
their pre-operative holding area room and provided a mask. Patients 
would ideally not stop at a ‘front desk.’ 
PRE-OPERATIVE 
HOLDING AREA 
Registration would ideally take place here before each patient 
prepared for surgery. All beds should be adequately spaced. If 
curtains separate beds, they should be cleaned after each patient. 
OPERATING ROOMS Each operating room would ideally have its own air-handling system 
to minimize air-based contamination and consider using high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Minimize the number of 
people in the room. Minimize non-sterile equipment such as X-ray 
machines, navigation consoles and robots as virus may last up to 72 
hours on these surfaces. 
ANESTHESIA Spinal anesthesia should be used preferentially over general 
anesthesia to decrease aerosolized particles from each patient 
within the operating room. 
SURGICAL 
HOODS/HELMETS 
Surgical helmets/hoods should be modified for increased protection 
against viruses for those wearing these systems. Alternatively, 
operating room personnel can eschew the helmets/hoods and use a 
N-95 mask and face shield in their place. 
FORCED-AIR 
WARMING SYSTEM 
These devices should be used with caution as they may increase the 
distribution of aerosolized particles during the case. Blankets may be 
more effective at decreasing particulate generation and distribution. 
SCRUBS Scrubs should be changed frequently, potentially after each patient. 
ROOM TURNOVER Each room should be cleaned between cases with solutions such as 
dilute povidone-iodine and alcohol that are effective against viruses 
and other pathogens. 
POST-ANESTHESIA 
CARE UNIT 
All beds should be adequately spaced. If curtains separate beds, 
they should be cleaned after each patient. Patients who are not 
going home on the same day should be brought to their hospital 
room expeditiously.  
HOSPITAL STAY If patients can be safely discharged on the same day as their surgery, 
they should be sent home. Protocols should be in place to facilitate 
this process and patients and their families should be educated of 
this policy prior to undergoing their total joint arthroplasty. 
‘ROUNDS’ Telemedicine should be used to ‘round’ on the patients post-
operatively to limit direct contact. 
Table 1: Common steps for the surgical procedure and recommendations for decreasing the 
potential viral load for each step. 
